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Cyberattacks are computer-to-computer attacks undermining the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of 
computers and/or the information they hold.a The importance of securing cyberspace is increasing, along with the 
sophistication and potential significance of the results of the attacks. Moreover, attacksb involve increasingly 
sophisticated coordination among multiple hackers across international boundaries, where the aim has shifted 
from fun and self-satisfaction to financial or military gain, with clear and self-reinforcing motivation; for 
example, the number of new malicious code threats worldwide increased more than 71% from 2008 to 2009. [14] 
Key Insights 
The worldwide effort to safeguard against attacks seems to lack coordination and collaboration. The majority of 
cybercriminals go unpunished, with their skills often exceeding those of the international authorities responsible 
for stopping them. [8] One economic barrier to information security is the presence of “externalities” [1]; an 
example of a negative externality is when a computer infected by a virus harms other computers in the same 
network, and a positive externality is when a security breach targeting specific software with a large installed base 
is disclosed, possibly alerting other users and preventing further loss due to being attacked. In economics, positive 
externalities drive economic agents to invest less than would be socially desirable, even when protection is 
technically feasible. Among countries, one country's effort in terms of enforcement and investment in security 
infrastructure makes other countries more secure by reducing the number of attacks originating from within its 
borders. Alternatively, attackers who are themselves threatened may virtually relocate to other countries. Such 
externalities inhibit achievement of a globally desirable level of country-level investment and enforcement action. 
 
Information security is recognized as both a technical issue and a critical policy and business issue.[10] The 
presence of externalities in information security scenarios requires international collaboration among national 
governments.[7] The Convention on Cybercrime (Europe Treaty Series No. 185)c adopted by the Council of 
Europe, November 23, 2001, was the first and is still the most important international treaty focused on 
cybercrimes, aiming to “set up a fast and effective regime of international cooperation.”d As of January 2012, 32 
countries have ratified the Convention, though 17 member countries have not.e Li wrote, “The pressure against 
not ratifying the treaty coming from inside the countries seems to be a greater obstacle than the differences over 
the drafting of the document.”[5] 
                                                          
a Based on Law Enforcement Tools and Technologies for Investigating Cyber Attacks: GAP Analysis Report. Institute for 
Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College, 2004;http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/gar.html 
b Hackers are defined as violators of information security; in this study, attackers and hackers were viewed as equivalent. 
c We say "the Convention" as shorthand for the Convention on Cybercrime (European Treaty Series No. 185). 
d http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm  
e http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG  
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The first step toward improving international collaboration is to understand the nature of the attacks, with respect 
to national demographics and international policy. For instance, cybersecurity research by ISPs has sought to 
identify organizations hosting abnormally high levels of malicious content.[4,13] While industry-based research 
and recommendations on information security (such as Symantec Internet Security Threat Reports and Microsoft 
Security Intelligence Reports) are publicly accessible, they tend to focus on the technical aspect of cyberattacks 
rather than on their effects on policy and business. Therefore, more information about countries hosting malicious 
activity is required, including how attacks are distributed and correlated among them, and how these security 
statistics link to national demographics and international policy. 
 
This article explores the nature and scope of cyberattacks originating from a number of countries, analyzing 
SANS Institute country-level intrusion-detection samples, 2005–2009. The SANS Institute established the 
Internet Storm Center (ISC http://isc.sans.edu/) in 2001, aiming to assist ISPs and end users to safeguard 
themselves against cyberattacks. The ISC monitors the kind of data-collection, analysis, and warning systems 
used in weather forecasting. The DShield data set used by ISC is a collection of network-security logs from its 
voluntary subscriber base throughout the Internet. Each DShield contributor reports information about the source 
of an attack whenever an alert is sounded by its firewall. Given its worldwide coverage, the DShield dataset 
provides a relatively accurate representation of malicious traffic, as detected by hundreds of 
networks.[12] Though the logs are not comprehensive enough to fully disclose specific types of attacks and the 
location of the original attacker(s), it does show the aggregate selection of sources from where the attacks might 
have originated. Following the rational-choice theory in classic criminology,[6] criminals make decisions to 
maximize their net return by weighing potential costs and benefits. Any country with abundant resources and 
porous borders is likely to become the sanctuary for cyberattacks; hence, the nature of the DShield dataset fits 
well with our research interests. 
Our analysis of country-level data yielded three important lessons (described in the following sections) that could 
be a foundation for further collaboration and coordination among countries: 
Lesson 1. Identify the top sources of attacks from demographic characteristics. Ranking countries by number of 
attacks based on the SANS data (see Figure 1) is similar to that published by Symantec Corporation.[14,15] The 
distribution of cyberattacks skews heavily toward certain countries; the SANS data shows that the top 10 (20) 
countries accounted for 74.3% (87.3%) of the total number of global attacks in 2009. Thus the top countries may 
be considered more responsible than other countries for the rampant cyberattacks. 
 
However, the volume of attacks alone cannot be used to identify relative likelihood of threats and guide 
international collaboration. Logically, the number of cyberattacks originating from any single country is related to 
development of its information infrastructure, Internet penetration, and domestic population.[5] This correlation 
leads to the formation of three additional indices of top origin after adjusting for economic development 
(see Figure 2a), population (Figure 2b), and number of Internet users (Figure 2c), respectively (see Table 
1).f These indices are useful indicators for identifying threats previously ignored due to being hidden within the 
enormous volume of attacks. In these indices, the highest-ranking countries in terms of number of originating 
                                                          
f Source: Euromonitor International's Global Market Information Database. We excluded countries with relatively few 
computers (<400,000 in 2005); they also generally have relatively low economic development and would possibly inflate our 
indices due to their small denominators. Likewise, the samples from these countries in the SANS dataset are less stable than 
those from other countries. 
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attacks are encouraged to improve their information-security infrastructure and enhance legal enforcement against 
attacks, as well as against the heaviest attack generators by volume. We find substantial differences across the 
three indices, which seem to complement one another. Zimbabwe (ignored in other indices) is identified as the top 
source of attacks per capita; Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia are also more important threats than is indicated by 
attack volume alone.g Likewise, the attacks per GDP PPP (purchasing power parity) reveals potential threats from 
Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Estonia, Jordan, and Latvia, and attacks-per-Internet-user includes Bangladesh and 
Slovenia. 
However, none of these demographic factors alone fully explains the variation in cyberattacks among countries. 
Hence, we conduct a simple regression to identify additional countries with an inherently large volume of attacks 
that cannot be explained by standard demographic parameters. The following formula represents a regression 
model, with each variable representing the ratio over its global level on an annual basis where a residual term 
equals the observed proportion of attacks minus the proportion predicted by the evaluated parameters and captures 
the component that cannot be justified by economic development, population, and Internet penetration.h Thus, a 
positive residual indicates attacks beyond expectations originating from a country relative to the global average; a 
negative residual indicates fewer attacks than expected; the top countries can be identified by residuals, as 
in Table 1. Table 1 also lists countries among the top 20 by total attack volume, to which the regression model 
attributes the most overestimated attacks; the residual term is a large negative. These countries might indicate 
possible overrepresentation when applying the volume-based approach alone. The U.S. is most frequently among 
the top 10. In addition, most of the top countries (based on total attack volume), except China, have signed or 
ratified the Convention, including France, the Netherlands, and the U.S., and most countries in which the number 
of hosted attacks is below the global average have likewise signed or ratified. Among them, the number of attacks 
originating from France, Japan, and the U.K. was below the global average in the years (2005–2009) we 
surveyed, despite their considerable economic development, population, and Internet penetration. Canada and 
Spain, which were both at the top for volume of originating attacks in 2005 with an extraordinary number of 
attacks, surprisingly generated fewer cyberattacks than the global average in 2009. Moreover, three of the nine 
overrepresented countries in 2009 in Table 1—Canada, Japan, and Poland—were among the 13 countries that 
signed the Convention in 2005 (or earlier) but still have not ratified it. Due to the number of attacks below the 
global average, these countries may not have as much incentive to join as other developed countries. In contrast, 
some countries with negligible total attack volume were among the top 20, 2005–2009, with an extraordinary 
number of attacks, including Bangladesh and Zimbabwe. The number of such underrepresented countries 
increased from two in 2005 to six in 2009, with none signing the Convention. 
These observations reflect the international divide and dynamics of attack sources associated with the Convention. 
First, the top-origin countries, having developed economies, are more likely to accede to the Convention, though 
they remain sanctuaries of cyberattacks and potential cyberattackers, even after ratification of the Convention, 
including Germany and the U.S. Second, developing countries that have not ratified the Convention host 
disproportionately more attacks and potential attackers than would otherwise be projected from their economic 
                                                          
g Rankings of these countries changed by 20 or more places compared to their rankings based on attack volume. We 
chose countries with populations of more than one million to eliminate high rankings due to small denominators; 
likewise, we excluded countries with GDP PPP <$25 million and number of Internet users <800,000, 2005–2009. 
h As the three variables correlate with one another, estimates of coefficients are less precise, so are not reported. Despite such 
correlations, we are better off including these factors to obtain residuals they do not explain; R-squared values for all 
estimated models are >85%. 
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development, population, and Internet penetration. Consequently, while the benefit of joining the Convention is 
not reflected in the top lists of attack origins, there is a spillover effect on countries that have not joined. In fact, 
such an international divide on international collaboration motivates attackers to launch attacks due to the risk 
advantage from facilitating worldwide network connectivity. Developing countries have relatively poor 
information-security infrastructure and insufficient resources for deterring cyberattacks.5 As a result, the lower 
risk of launching cyberattacks from them may attract attackers seeking sources that leverage the risk advantage. 
Overall, the combination of total attack volume and demographic characteristics reveals inherently high threat 
levels of cyberattacks in certain countries, partly negating responsibility of countries that may be overrepresented 
in terms of total attack volume. 
Lesson 2. Global diffusion trend across regions, not countries. The world has flattened across regions in terms of 
sources of cyberattacks. We employed the Herfindahl index to examine this phenomenon, a commonly used 
measure of industry concentration calculated for any given year by H = ΣNi S2i, where N denotes the number of 
countries and Si is the share of country i out of total attacks. Based on the Herfindahl index, Figure 3 reflects a 
diffusion trend of attacks globally and across regions. The decreasing Herfindahl index indicates the diffusion of 
attacks across regions, and is consistent with global diffusion. However, global diffusion in cyberattacks did not 
spread evenly across all countries. Rather, attacks within Asia and Africa have become more concentrated over 
time, while the Herfindahl index for European countries did not vary from 2005 to 2009. That concentration was 
led by the surge in share of attacks originating from a few countries (see Table 2). Interestingly, most countries 
listed in Table 2 have still not ratified the Convention (except Romania and Belgium) and are listed in Table 1 as 
the top countries with extraordinary attacks in 2009. 
The global-diffusion trend across regions, not countries, manifests through manipulation of attack sources by 
attackers. While the world is highly connected through the Internet, cybercriminal legislation and jurisdiction 
sometimes stops at national borders. This limited coverage facilitates “risk arbitrage,” with attackers able to 
commit cyberattacks with relatively low risk of government enforcement by exploiting the divide between 
domestic legislation and jurisdiction. As a result, attackers expand their attack sources (such as botnets) while 
focusing on countries with underdeveloped information-security infrastructures. 
Lesson 3. Considerable interdependence of global trends and compelling substitution effect. Interdependence 
represents another major weakness concerning cyberattacks at the country level; we define interdependence as the 
co-movement of attacks between countries. Positive correlation between cyberattacks originating from two 
countries represents movement in the same direction, while negative correlation represents movement in opposite 
directions. Interdependence is measured by the correlation of the weekly global proportions of attacks between 
any pair of countries. This method helps tease out co-movement in attacks between two countries due to the 
global trend; for example, our factor analysis found that for the top 16 countries ever listed as a top-10 country for 
attack origin (2005–2009), 49% of attacks could be explained by a single (general) factor that can be labeled 
“global co-movement.”i 
After ruling out the grand global trend, we still observed a high level of positive interdependence between given 
pairs of countries.j The pair-wise correlations (based on volume and proportion of attacks, respectively) between 
                                                          
i Vulnerability embedded in a dominant software platform could expose millions of computers to security threats. 
j Our measure of pairwise interdependence is conservative, as it might underestimate positive interdependence; an increase in 
one country's share from a surge in attacks originating from within its borders decreases other countries' shares of attacks 
worldwide, with the denominator becoming greater for all other countries. 
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the U.S. (a dominant source among countries identified as harboring malicious activity) and other countries 
(2005–2009) are outlined in Figures 4a and 4b. Using correlation of shares of attacks, the correlation between the 
U.S. and other countries, as in Figure 4b, dramatically decreased compared to the correlation of attack volume 
in Figure 4a. In Figure 4b, France is seen as having the highest pair-wise correlation (0.53) with the U.S. Other 
countries with positive correlations above 0.30 with the U.S. include the Philippines (0.39), Slovenia (0.38), 
Estonia (0.36), and Singapore (0.35) in descending order of correlation, respectively. We also confirmed positive 
pair-wise interdependence as stronger among certain countries, including Japan and South Korea (0.65). 
 
Despite considerable global co-movement, as in Figure 4a, Colombia was negatively correlated with the U.S. (-
0.40). We found significant negative correlations between the U.S. and several countries, even after adjusting the 
denominator to reduce possible overestimation of pair-wise interdependence.k While Lesson 2 on global diffusion 
revealed that attack sources might disproportionately concentrate in certain countries, Lesson 3 on 
interdependence suggests that some attack sources might simultaneously substitute other attack sources. 
Positive interdependence in cyberattacks results directly from the most general technique applied in a cyberattack: 
First, the attacker communicates hacking experience and skills via online forums, helping other attackers exploit 
software vulnerabilities simultaneously. Second, computers in various locations might be compromised, thus 
becoming part of a botnet, or zombie network. A botnet consisting of more distributed computers could leverage 
the economies of scale in operational cost and increase the chance of successful attacks. Thus, attackers (such as 
botmasters) might initiate attacks from multiple countries by controlling millions of infected computers. Finally, 
malicious code (such as Trojans and worms) could propagate across networks through Internet traffic, data 
exchange, and access. 
In contrast, negative interdependence in cyberattacks is probably related to the displacement effect identified by 
Png et al.[9] that the announcement by the U.S. government on enforcement against cybercriminals could 
indirectly increase the number of attacks originating from other countries. That is, to avoid increased risk of 
punishment in the U.S., attackers are thus motivated to relocate their botnets from there to other countries with 
lower risk. 
Though specific types of collaboration and countermeasures may differ with respect to positive and negative 
interdependence, improved international collaboration is essential. Positive interdependence may be reduced 
through improved implementation of the Convention on Cybercrime, while negative interdependence may require 
improved country-to-country collaboration to minimize the incentive to shift attacks between countries. 
75 Countries 
Based on SANS Institute daily reports on country-level intrusion detection (2005–2009), our study applied the 
economic indices to analysis of the volume of cyberattacks originating from 75 countries, with coverage limited 
by the availability of data. For example, no observations were reported from countries with DShield contributors, 
                                                          
k Overestimation on negative interdependence is due to the same reason as in footnote j; hence, we use the global-attack 
volume minus the attacks originating from within the U.S. as the denominator to calculate approximate global shares of 
attacks from all countries other than the U.S., then examine their correlation with the U.S. global share, respectively. The 
extent of negative correlation between the U.S. and other countries is smaller than before the adjustment but stays at the same 
level; countries in descending correlation order include Romania (-0.48), Peru (-0.40), Colombia (-0.39), Australia (-0.33), 
and Denmark (-0.32). 
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as the DShield dataset was subject to errors and noise due to misconfiguration of network intrusion and detection 
systems and false reports.[12] 
Our analysis of country-level data yielded three important lessons that may provide a foundation for further 
collaboration and coordination among countries. The diffusion and interdependence trend of cyberattacks 
(Lessons 2 and 3) (2005–2009) highlights the importance of international cooperation and implementation of 
policies in fighting cyberattacks. However, the present cooperation in detection, investigation, and prosecution 
both domestically and internationally, including the Convention, is insufficient for relieving the worldwide threat 
to information security. This limitation is evidenced by the extraordinary ongoing surge in cyberattacks 
originating from certain countries and the persistence of attacks from other countries at the top of the list (Lesson 
1). 
Unfortunately, incentives for countries to join the Convention are limited due to concern over the cost of legal 
cooperation and invasion of national sovereignty.[5,7] Apart from Canada, Japan, and the U.S., most countries 
signing the Convention are members of the European Union. Without worldwide agreement, attackers are free to 
leverage the risk advantage in countries outside the Convention with poor information security infrastructures. 
These countries (identified by our analysis) represent hidden sources behind the top sources of cyberattack origin 
based on total attack volume (such as Bangladesh and Columbia). 
 
Unfortunately, incentives for countries to join the Convention are limited  
due to concern over the cost of legal cooperation and invasion of national sovereignty. 
 
For countries in compliance with the Convention, positive externalities in information security limits incentives to 
cooperate at the expected level.[7] Thus, it is not strange that Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands hosted an 
extraordinary number of attacks, given they fully complied with the Convention (Lesson 1). Furthermore, 
insufficient effort maintaining information security and enforcement may exacerbate global security threats due to 
negative externalities. 
National Responsibility 
Based on this discussion and our observations, we suggest the following steps for national governments 
worldwide: 
Measurement. First, in order to create an effective mechanism to tackle cybercrime, they need precise 
measurement of cyberattacks originating from each country, something generally missing from any road map on 
international collaboration. Indeed, such an approach would help address the ex ante incentive of international 
collaboration and ex post incentive of sufficient inputs. 
 
The state of attack deterrence today recasts a well-known principle involving software quality: “You can't control 
what you can't measure.”[2] Lack of widely accepted, reliable, stable measurement of the number of cyberattacks 
originating from each country inhibits understanding a particular country's rights and liabilities in relieving the 
global threat to information security. 
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The DShield database may provide a feasible baseline to motivate and strengthen international collaboration on 
information security. We may refer to the global debate on carbon-dioxide emission control, which likewise 
incorporates the characteristics of externalities. For instance, global carbon-dioxide emissions are effectively 
controlled by incorporating the infrastructure and economic state of countries with statistical estimates of 
emissions from multiple organizations.[3,16] In the cyberattack context, a similar “charge” may be issued to each 
country, depending on responsibility and demographic status. 
 
Responsibility. Second, given the cross-border aspects of cyberattacks, we stress national responsibility of 
countries that might host compromised computers, possibly involving intermediate cyberattacks launched by 
foreign perpetrators. Unlike the sources of carbon emissions, which may be traced, measurement of cyberattacks 
originating from individual countries includes attacks unconsciously hosted by compromised computers in one 
country while the physical location of hackers is elusive, as reflected in DShield data. In such a case, the country 
is actually an intermediary facilitating cyberattacks. For instance, the notable increase in malicious-code ranking 
for Brazil in 2009 compared to previous years was actually due to the Downadup worm infecting a large number 
of computers in Brazil.[14] As intermediaries bear less responsibility than victims for a loss due to a cyberattack, 
there is less incentive to avoid becoming an intermediary than a victim. In order to reach an optimal level of 
investment in global information security, any measurement must take into account the number of cyberattacks 
passing through a particular country. 
 
Collaboration. Third, based on any available measurement of cyberattacks, the indices we adopted in our study 
provide further insight when selecting partner countries for regional collaboration. Top countries listed by both 
“total volume” and “extraordinary number of attacks” represent a much greater threat to global information 
security than other countries. Their participation is thus crucial to collaborative enforcement, as with Denmark 
and the U.S. in Table 1. Top countries with surged shares of cyberattacks that might otherwise be ignored due to 
their negligible volume reflect the movement of underground forces committing cyberattacks, as with Colombia 
and Romania in Table 2. Finally, the high correlation among groups of countries in cyberattacks may indicate the 
countries' participation in hacker activity, including zombie networks, and network traffic. Their joint 
commitment and participation is thus required to deter cybercriminals. 
 
Constitutional conflict. Fourth, as it is difficult to achieve global collaboration in information security quickly, 
priority must be given to more critical information-security issues and certain developing countries; for example, 
some provisions in the Convention might conflict with constitutional principles of certain countries. The 
Convention takes a broad view, including cybercrimes that, though important, are less related to cyber hacking 
(such as copyright and child pornography) but might run counter to constitutional law. It is permissible for parties 
to the Convention to modify their obligations on a limited number of the Convention's Articles; for instance, the 
U.S. has “taken a partial reservation to the Jurisdiction article (Article 22, Jurisdiction) because it does not as a 
general matter assert jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. citizens abroad (see the U.S. Department of 
Justice home page http://www.justice.gov/).” 
It is important to assert which articles and provisions are more critical for cybersecurity against hacking and 
should be prioritized or strongly mandated. Otherwise, the full benefit of legal harmonization is simply not 
possible. Regarding prioritization, we identified certain developing countries that generate more attacks 
disproportionate to their economic development. They may promise higher return on investment in improving the 
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state of global cybersecurity compared to other developing countries but lack sufficient resources and the 
technical foundation to comply with the standard required by the Convention. The benefit of joining the 
Convention for these countries is relatively low because their national industrial infrastructure is less dependent 
on a network economy. For them participation should thus be prioritized with appropriate technical and/or 
financial support. The Convention has supported multiple projects to guide developing countries but has 
concentrated on Eastern Europe. 
Conclusion 
An alternative approach to worldwide cybersecurity beyond these four suggestions is to adopt the view introduced 
by Schjølberg and Ghernaouti-Hélie[11] that “A Treaty or a set of treaties at the United Nations level on cyber 
security and cyber crime should be a global proposal for the 2010s that is based on a potential for consensus.” 
[11]  The Convention is still viewed by most countries outside Europe as a regional initiative, though full benefit 
of legal cooperation is possible only when all the countries ratify any treaty in light of the strong interdependence 
of cyberattacks across countries. 
 
We hope our suggestions trigger a fruitful discussion that enhances the state of international collaboration and 
legal harmonization. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Attack rankings, 2009. 
 
 
Figure 3. Herfindahl index by year (three-year moving average). 
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Figure 2. (a) Attack/GDP PPP; (b) attack/population; (c) attack/Internet user rankings, 2009. 
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Figure 4. Correlation of (a) attack volume and (b) share of attack between the U.S. and other countries,  
2005-2009. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Top countries for originating attacks (by index). 
 
Table 2. Top countries with surged share of attacks, by % increase in 2009 compared to 2005. 
 
 
